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ABSTRACT

Why would individuals engage in or support contentious politics? This question is
challenging to answer with observational data where causal factors are correlated and
difficult to measure. Using a survey-embedded experiment, we focus on three
situational factors: grievances, risk, and identity. We also explore how individual
differences in sociopolitical orientations—social dominance orientation (SDO) and rightwing authoritarianism (RWA)—impact action. Grievances influence engagement in and
support for protests. Risk influences engagement in protest, but not support for it.
Regardless of condition, SDO and RWA help explain why some people engage in
protest while others do not, particularly within the same context.

Grievances stemming from repression and discrimination have long been seen as a key
cause of political protest. 1 While both dissident movements and academics point to
grievance as a catalyst for protest, others note that many are aggrieved but few actually
engage in protest or show willingness to support it. 2 There is a large body of
theoretical, 3 qualitative, 4 and quantitative 5 work on factors that lead to mobilization at
the state level. Yet there has been less work that focuses on factors that encourage
support for protest at the individual level. Some qualitative work based primarily on
interviews has found that grievance is often reported as a key factor in individuals
mobilizing. 6 Similarly, quantitative research at the individual level finds that grievance
influences protest and support for protest. 7 While these micro-level research findings
are promising, they often include only participants who actually protest. By only
examining people already engaged in protest the researchers are selecting on the
dependent variable. This approach does not afford a level of comparison that allows the
research to account for why people who do not choose to protest would make that

choice. Thus these analyses limit our ability to draw causal inferences about what leads
individuals to engage in protest behavior.
Experimental approaches have been underutilized in this area of research and can
help tease out the causal factors that make individuals sympathetic to protest. 8 In
addition to macro- and group-level analyses, we posit that micro-level factors can
explain differences in action under the same circumstances because—in the final
analysis—movements are made up of individuals who need to be willing to grab a sign
or risk pepper spray or even death to try to change society. Experimental, individuallevel research in this area can also shed light on the psychology of how the mass public
reacts to contentious politics and collective action. Regardless of whether individuals
take action themselves, the general public’s reaction to mobilization—either positive or
negative—can influence the movement and its impact. 9
Our article is organized as follows: We first discuss how grievances have been linked
to support for protest and the roles that risk and social identity can play. We also
provide a theoretical account for how individual differences in sociopolitical orientation—
as embodied in social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism—may
account for variation in support for protest above and beyond these situational factors.
We then describe the design of our survey experiment and the data collection process.
Last, we present our analysis, summarize our findings, highlight potential limitations of
our survey experiment, and suggest areas for research in the future.
Grievances, Risk, Identity, and Mobilization
We focus on three types of grievances that are mentioned frequently in the literature,
which we term discrimination, political repression, and physical harm. There is a long
line of scholarship connecting these grievances to political action. 10 Yet these
grievances often co-occur in the real world. One contribution of this article is to
distinguish among different types of repression and their impact on support for political
action with the aim of assessing the causal mechanism that has been identified in prior
research. Discrimination is unequal treatment based on membership in an ascriptive
group, such as a religion or ethnicity. Common examples of discrimination include
reduced access to employment, housing, and educational opportunities compared to
members of other groups, and restrictions on religious practices or the use of one’s
language. 11 There is considerable evidence that the specific grievance of discrimination
is associated with greater protest and support for protest. Discrimination was the core
grievance behind the peaceful movement for equal treatment of Catholics in Northern
Ireland from the 1960s onward, and was also used to justify the terrorist campaign of
the Irish Republican Army. 12 Ending discrimination was the key objective of the
peaceful civil rights movement in the United States in the same period. 13 The second

category of grievance is political repression, which denies individuals political
enfranchisement and legitimate outlets through which their preferences can be
publicized and addressed. Others suggest that political repression, as we use the term,
is likely to produce support for extra-legal dissent, such as protest activities, as this may
be the only avenue available to citizens to publicize their grievances. 14 The third
category of grievance encompasses threats by the authorities to inflict physical harm on
individuals. Such physical repression for political reasons directly threatens survival or
liberty, and violations of physical integrity transgress universal norms of protecting the
body from physical harm. 15
While these grievances create incentives for political action, the likelihood that
individuals will act on these incentives is moderated by the expected response of the
authorities. In particular, we expect that selective targeting—that is, punishments
directed at individuals suspected of engaging in anti-regime activities, rather than at
entire groups—reduces willingness to engage in or support political action. Dissident
movements face powerful collective action problems; while some of the gains from
successful action accrue to all dissidents, the costs of such action in the form of
punishment by the state fall on individuals. 16 Selective targeting heightens this
collective action problem by focusing punishment on those that actively oppose the
regime and sparing those who remain indifferent or support the authorities, even if they
are members of ascriptive groups subject to discrimination or political or physical
repression. 17 The “opportunity structure” approach holds that risks or opportunities
presented by the political environment move actors away from or toward support for
protest. 18 The risk of punishment for mobilizing is a key component of the opportunity
structure. Tilly lays out the basic thinking of the impact of opportunity structures by
arguing that when there is a safe way to engage in politics, more people will protest or
support protests. 19 Although there is a literature on how costs and benefits impact
mobilization from a game theoretic perspective, 20 there is less empirical research on
this topic. 21 At the individual level, researchers have found support for the influence of
risk of punishment on people’s decision to protest. 22 The operationalization of risk in
most of these studies is problematic, however. Risk is not operationalized as a potential
cost imposed on the individual for protesting or supporting protest with a greater or
lesser likelihood of occurrence, but rather simply as a cost that will or will not be paid.
Such operationalizations are more consistent with the concept of grievance than the risk
that Lichbach speaks of in his work. 23 From a perspective that sees risk as a potential
cost, one should expect it to lead individuals to be less likely to take or support action.
As Lichbach argues, the risks of participation can differ across individuals, but those
risks that entail high costs should discourage participation—especially if the benefits of
mobilization are shared or unclear. 24 “The costs of participation, however are paid only

by those who participate. Some costs…could be minimal. Other costs (e.g. jail, injury, or
even death) are maximal.” 25 From this discussion, we expect that:
H1: Grievance increases willingness to protest and support protest most when
the risk of punishment is low.
Individuals might be more likely to protest to address grievances of “their” in-group.
This notion is consistent with the social identity perspective 26 and much research that
finds an affinity for one’s in-group over members of the out-group. De Weerd and
Kladermans found that strong group identification was linked to greater protest
engagement on behalf of one’s group, but not for out-groups. 27 At the same time, we
know that people who are not aggrieved will sometimes mobilize on behalf of people
who are. Thus, we expect that:
H2: Grievance will have a stronger impact on willingness to protest and support
protest among members of the group that is being subject to discrimination.
As previously discussed, it is difficult to identify causal mechanisms for engagement
in and support for action in contentious politics. Studying the role of identity on such
decisions is even more challenging in observational studies since perspectives cannot
be randomly assigned in real life. Experimental work is optimal here, yet there is a
dearth of such research on micro-level factors that impact political action.
Individual Differences and Mobilization
Situational variables like grievance, risk, and social identity are not the only meaningful
predictors of support for protest. Above and beyond these factors, we argue that
individual differences in sociopolitical orientations may predict additional variance in
protest that needs to be accounted for. Regardless of their circumstances, some
individuals may simply be more or less inclined to support protest.
To unpack the role of individual differences, we draw on the dual-process
model, 28 which suggests two basic dimensions govern preferences in the domains of
intergroup relations and politics. The first dimension reflects preferences for equality
versus inequality, and is best represented by social dominance orientation (SDO)—that
is, the degree to which one favors intergroup hierarchy over equality between
groups. 29 This dimension is psychologically rooted in power motives, low empathy, and
a view of the world as highly competitive. 30 SDO, as a distillation of this dimension, is
positively related to “hierarchy-enhancing” policy preferences (e.g., reduced
redistribution) and negatively related to “hierarchy-attenuating” ones (e.g., increased
redistribution); it also predicts hostility toward low-status minority groups—especially
those that seek to challenge existing hierarchies. 31 The second dimension reflects a
desire for conformity and social order, and it is best represented by right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA)—that is, the degree to which one is conventional, submissive to

in-group authority, and hostile toward cultural “others.” 32 RWA is especially related to
support for established authority figures and highly punitive attitudes toward groups that
are perceived to disturb social order and traditional values (e.g., minorities whose
values are thought to deviate from the “mainstream”). 33 This dimension is
psychologically rooted in conformity, low openness, and a perception of the world as
dangerous. 34 While there is typically a significant, positive relationship between SDO
and RWA, they measure distinct motivations that should have unique impacts on
political action net of each other. 35
In the context of political action, the logic of the dual-process approach suggests that
both SDO and RWA should be associated with reduced willingness to protest and
support protest. First, because protest, as a form of political action, is often utilized in
the service of universalistic, egalitarian goals, SDO should be associated with less
willingness to protest and support protest. In other words, individuals high in SDO
should be more invested in retaining society’s existing hierarchical organization.
Moreover, given the low individual benefits and potentially high individual costs
engaging in protest, overcoming the collective-action problem may require prosocial
sacrifices that competitive, high-SDO individuals are less willing to make. Consistent
with this, people higher in SDO are less supportive of nonviolent actions. 36 Second,
because protest typically represents a challenge to established institutions and ways of
doing things, RWA should also be associated with less protest and protest support. Put
another way, those high in RWA should be more inclined to support authorities to
maintain the status quo. Accordingly, research shows that people who score higher in
RWA are less inclined to engage in or support any form of political action against the
authorities. 37 Thus, we expect that:
H3: Participants with higher SDO scores will be less willing to protest or support
protest.
H4: Participants with higher RWA scores will be less willing to protest or support
protest.
In this study, we focus on SDO and RWA primarily as first-order individual-difference
explanations for variation in support for political action above and beyond those
accounted for by situational differences in grievance and risk. Nevertheless, we also
offer exploratory predictions about how SDO and RWA may moderate the impact of the
latter. Insofar as both individual differences make people resistant to protest, we might
also expect those high on each dimension to be less moved to action by circumstances
that heighten awareness of grievance or reduce the salience of risk. That is, if
individuals high in SDO and RWA generally find political action to be undesirable, then
they may respond with quiescence regardless of the unpleasantness of the status quo
or the extent to which pushback from authorities will be minimal.

Why the Experimental Approach?
An experimental approach allows us to tackle many issues that are difficult to address
with observational data. We highlight two contributions that a survey experiment makes
in this regard. First, research has identified many grievances that plausibly produce
mobilization, including discrimination, the denial of political rights, and violation of
physical integrity rights. Yet teasing out these effects is difficult because they often covary in observational settings. Understanding the relative importance of each type of
grievance for decisions to protest or support protest advances this research area.
Second, there is a debate in the literature about whether and how grievances interact
with other factors—such as the risk of punishment, the social identity of an individual,
and individual differences in sociopolitical orientation—to influence protest. Many of
these factors are difficult to measure in the context of opportunities for political
mobilization. An experimental approach can thus provide clearer evidence in favor of
the causal mechanisms suggested by the body of large-N and qualitative work on
grievances and protest.
In the present study, we use a general population survey experiment to
systematically examine the influence of grievances, risk of punishment, and social
identity on an individual’s decision to engage in and support protest. Control over the
treatments that individuals receive—in this case, vignettes—allow us to systematically
vary these factors. 38 Random assignment to treatment ensures that the resulting data
include sufficient variation along the multiple dimensions of interest. This variation is
often difficult to achieve with observational data. Some observational studies select
participants for research on the basis of the value of the dependent variable (e.g.,
interviewing only respondents who have engaged in protest or other forms of
contentious politics). In other research, key causal factors co-vary, making it difficult to
determine their individual effects on the dependent variable. 39 This collinearity makes it
difficult to tease out the independent effect of each grievance on willingness to engage
in and support political action. Survey and general population experiments have been
identified as one promising way to address these issues. 40
Survey experiments also allow us to measure relevant individual differences like
SDO and RWA. We can then examine how factors—both controlled and measured—
contribute to support for political action. We recognize that a survey experiment will not
alone address all of these points in a decisive way. With such studies, there are threats
to external validity since the scenario is hypothetical and stated preferences may not
reflect actual behavior if the scenario was real. In the concluding section, we are careful
to outline some of the limits of this approach. At the same time, though, an experimental
approach complements observational studies by allowing the researcher to test theory
by varying treatments in ways that allow estimation of their causal effects.

Research Design
The present experiment was administered online by Knowledge Networks (KN), and
drew from the KnowledgePanel, which is an online panel that is representative of the
U.S. adult population. Using probability-based sampling techniques, panel members are
randomly recruited. 41 Overall, 2,538 U.S. adult participants were drawn from the KN
panel. While some may prefer to sample from a population at higher likelihood to
actually take political action, we choose to survey the general U.S. population for
several reasons. First, it is infeasible to locate a subsample from the United States that
is already predisposed to mobilization, much less one that would be representative of
the larger group. Second, our prior research shows that experimental treatments have a
muted effect on samples from countries with higher levels of grievance and protest. In
this work, participants likely had high levels of real-world grievance, so our treatments
had little marginal effect. Taken at face value, this would suggest that grievances do not
impact protest, although clearly this is not the case. 42 Third, while many U.S. adults
may not have direct personal experience with the grievances under examination,
contentious politics and collective action do occur in the United States. The extent to
which the general public supports (or does to support) these actions can impact the
ultimate success of a movement. Thus, sampling from the general population can shed
light on the psychology of mass reaction to contentious politics.
We manipulated three factors: social identity perspective, grievance, and risk. First,
participants were randomly assigned to either the minority-group perspective or the
majority-group perspective. This created two subsamples within the study. Within each
subsample, participants were assigned to one of four possible grievance conditions: low
grievance; discrimination; political rights repression; or, physical harm. The degree of
risk from taking political action is included as binary variable: low or high. Thus, we have
a 2 × 4 × 2 between-subjects experimental design with sixteen conditions, as shown
on Table 1. Each participant was randomly assigned to one condition. The treatment
vignettes asked the participant to imagine that he or she lives in a hypothetical country,
and described the relevant combination of grievance, risk, and social identity
perspective in that context. The low-grievance treatment describes in general terms
some mistreatment of members of the minority group, but the nature of this
mistreatment is kept deliberately vague: it is described as occurring some years ago,
and the vignette states that minority-group members in the country currently hold fewer
grievances. See the Appendix for the texts of these treatments.
The grievances described in all vignettes are clearly targeted at members of the
minority group in the country, regardless of which identity group the participant was
assigned. Thus, a participant in the majority-social-identity perspective subsample who
was assigned to the discrimination grievance read a vignette describing discrimination

against members of the minority group (the “other”). These participants were asked if
they would take action in protest of discrimination faced by an ethnic “other.” In contrast,
a participant in the minority-social-identity perspective subsample read a description of
discrimination against the minority group (his or her own group). These participants
were asked if they would take action in protest of discrimination faced by members of
their own ethnic group. The risk of punishment condition is contingent on the actions,
not the identity, of the respondent. The risk of being punished is described as low or
high for respondents that decide to engage in protest activities.
Table 1. Experimental conditions. (Table view)
Condition Social identity perspective
Subsample 1: Minority perspective
1
Minority
2
Minority
3
Minority
4
Minority
5
Minority
6
Minority
7
Minority
8
Minority
Subsample 2: Majority perspective
9
Majority
10
Majority
11
Majority
12
Majority
13
Majority
14
Majority
15
Majority
16
Majority

Grievance

Risk

None
None
Discrimination
Discrimination
Political rights
Political rights
Physical harm
Physical harm

Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

None
None
Discrimination
Discrimination
Political rights
Political rights
Physical harm
Physical harm

Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

Participants first read their randomly assigned vignette and then answered a series
of questions. Our outcome of interest is taking political action. Since this can take shape
in a number of ways, we used three specific measures of political action as dependent
variables: engaging in protest, providing financial support for protest, and viewing
protest as justified. 43 Participants then completed measures of the two individual
differences—that is, SDO and RWA (which were measured, not manipulated). Last,
participants answered demographic questions and manipulation checks for the
experimental treatments. 44

Data Analysis
Table 2 shows demographic and descriptive statistics for the key variables. We break
this out by assignment to the minority or majority identity, since doing so for each of our
sixteen treatment groups would be unwieldy. Treatment values and covariates, such as
age, appear well-balanced across these two groups of respondents.
Table 2. Demographics and descriptive statistics. (Table view)

Male
Female
Age range
Mean age
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Engage in
protest
Donate to
protest
Justify protest
SDO
RWA
Total size

Overall
sample
1,299 (51%)
1,239 (49%)
18–94
49.6
1,887
(74.3%)
277 (11%)
213 (8.4%)
161 (6.3%)

2,538

Minority perspective
subsample
617 (48%)
642 (52%)
18–94
49.9
951 (74.4%)

Majority perspective
subsample
657 (51%)
622 (49%)
18–93
49.2
936 (74.3%)

130 (10.2%)
110 (8.6%)
68 (5.3%)
643 (50.3%)

147 (11.2%)
103 (8.2%)
93 (7.4%)
530 (42.1%)

179 (14%)

179 (14.2%)

5.32 (1.83)
−1.33 (1.22)
4.21 (1.51)
1,279

5.25 (1.82)
−1.34 (1.21)
4.28 (1.47)
1,259

Note. For Action options, the number and percentage of participants who selected that they would
engage in each action. For the engagement and justification questions, higher scores indicate greater
level of agreement on a 7-point scale from 1 to 7. For the SDO and RWA questions, higher scores
indicated stronger levels of each social personality factor on a 7-point scale from −3 to 3 for SDO and
from 1 to 7 for RWA.

Separate regression models were estimated for the minority-social-identity
subsample and the majority-social-identity subsample. 45 Across models we control for
three variables that could impact our results: passing the manipulation check, age, and
being a member of a minority group in real life. Passing the manipulation check
indicates greater attention to the material so we expect a stronger result for these
participants. Younger people may be more likely to engage in political action. While we
assign participants to a social-identity perspective, they bring their personal experiences
to the study so we control for being a minority community member in real life. Further,

as a robustness check, we also estimate all models with only participants whose
assigned perspective matches their real-world identity (minority participant assigned to
minority subgroup and non-minority participant assigned to majority subgroup). 46 We
report models where each type of grievance (discrimination; political rights repression;
physical harm) is individually included to examine their unique contributions to the
outcome variables. In additional analyses, we also collapsed the three grievance
conditions into a single category and entered the grievance manipulation into the
analysis as a single grievance-versus-no-grievance dummy variable, as has been done
in previous studies.
In Table 3, we analyze the impact of grievance and risk of punishment on the
decision to engage in protest. This dependent variable can take two values (yes or no),
so models are estimated using logistic regression. The table presents odds ratios for
each independent variable; ratios greater (less) than one indicate a positive (negative)
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Clear patterns emerge
that grievances generally increase protest. In models 1 and 3, we create a dichotomous
measure indicating assignment to any of the grievance conditions. To properly assess
H1, we interact the measures of grievance with the measure of risk of punishment an
individual faces. Any grievance is associated with a 116 percent increase in the odds of
protest in the minority group-identity condition, and a 89 percent increase in the majority
perspective when the subject faces a low risk of punishment. The likelihood of protest
when the subject holds a grievance and faces a high risk of punishment is 62 percent
lower in the minority group-identity condition and 42 percent lower in the majority groupidentity (although this relationship is significant at the p < .1 level). Figures
1 and 2 visualize the substantive effects of the likelihood of engaging in protest
contingent on low and high risk conditions for the minority and majority subsamples,
respectively. 47 Consistent with H1, the likelihood of individual participation in protest is
greatest when a grievance exists and risk of punishment is low.
Models 2 and 4 are identical to models 1 and 3, but use the different types of
grievances as independent variables. Low risk of punishment combined with any
specific grievance increases protest likelihood in the minority group. In the majority
group, low punishment risk combined with either discrimination or political rights
violation increased protest likelihood. High risk of punishment combined with specific
grievances consistently reduces protest in the minority group. The relationships are less
consistent among the majority group—high risk combined with discrimination or physical
harm is associated with a lower likelihood of protest (p < .1), but this is not the case for
political repression. Higher SDO scores and higher RWA scores each decrease
engagement in protest across samples. Across subsamples, a one-unit increase in SDO
score decreased protest engagement by 31–32 percent depending on the model.

Similarly, a one-unit increase in RWA score decreased protest odds by 15 percent in
the minority-perspective subsample and by 19 percent in the majority-perspective
subsample. Finally, in exploratory analyses that are not tabled here, we also examine
the moderating effects of SDO and RWA with respect to each treatment condition; these
interactions were not significant.

Figure 1. Marginal effects of grievance on protest engagement for low and high risk conditions in the
minority perspective subsample.

Now we explore the impact of grievance on donating money to support protest. The
dependent variable here is a binary indicator of providing financial support for protest,
so we again use logistic regression to estimate the models. As Table 4 shows, the
presence of any grievances combined with a low risk of punishment still predicts
providing financial support to protest, but only for those in the minority-social-identity
perspective subsample (model 5), for whom the odds of donation are 90 percent larger
compared to participants in the high-grievance condition. When breaking grievances
apart, those in the minority-social-identity perspective who faced discrimination or
physical repression and low risk of punishment showed 100 percent (p < .1) and 150
percent, respectively, greater odds of providing financial support for protest, while denial
of political rights combined with low risk did not influence the provision of financial
support (model 6). No combination of grievance and risk influenced willingness to
donate money in support of protesters in the majority condition. These findings are

somewhat consistent with H1. Low risk increases donations among those assigned to a
grievance condition, but only among the minority group. We suspect that the weaker
effects of grievance and risk may result from a plausible assumption among subjects
that the severity of punishment for those who actually protest would be greater than for
those who support dissidents with small donations. Protesters might be attacked, jailed,
or shot, while those who make donations would likely face lower costs such as a fine or
legal prosecution.

Figure 2. Marginal effects of grievance on protest engagement for low and high risk conditions in the
majority perspective subsample.

With respect to the individual differences, both SDO and RWA again predicted
outcomes. A one-unit increase in SDO score is associated with a 28 percent decrease
in the odds of donating in the minority-perspective subsample and 22–23 percent
decrease in the majority-perspective subsample, depending on the model. Similarly, a
one-unit increase in RWA score is associated with 18 percent lower odds of donating to
the protest in both subsamples. For exploratory purposes, we again examined the
interactions between treatment conditions and both SDO and RWA. As before, the
results did not provide evidence that either individual difference moderated the impact of
the treatments.

Table 3. Engage in a protest march. (Table view)

Grievance (dummy)
Discrimination
Political rights
Physical harm
High risk
Grievance × High risk
Discrimination × High
risk
Political rights × High
risk
Physical harm × High
risk
Manipulation check
passed
SDO
RWA
Age
Minority (dummy)
Observations

Minority perspective
subsample
Model 1
Model 2
2.16***
(0.43)
2.59***
(0.64)
2.38***
(0.59)
1.63* (0.40)
1.28 (0.31)
1.28 (0.31)
0.38** (0.11)
0.34** (0.12)

2.58***
(0.34)
0.69***
(0.04)
0.85***
(0.04)
1.00 (0.004)
0.87* (0.12)
1,228

Majority perspective
subsample
Model 3
Model 4
1.89** (0.39)
2.13** (0.53)
1.92** (0.46)

0.87 (0.23)
0.58 † (0.17)

1.66 † (0.43)
0.86 (0.23)
0.52 † (0.18)

0.44* (0.15)

0.73 (0.26)

0.35** (0.13)

0.52 † (0.19)

2.59***
(0.35)
0.68***
(0.04)
0.85***
(0.04)
1.00 (0.004)
0.87 (0.12)
1,228

1.57** (0.20)

1.56** (0.20)

0.69*** (0.04)

0.68*** (0.04)

0.81*** (0.04)

0.81*** (0.04)

1.00 (0.004)
1.14 (0.17)
1,197

1.00 (0.004)
1.13 (0.18)
1,197

Logistic regression models. Constants not reported.
Note. Odds ratios are presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

In Table 5, we analyze the impact of grievance on level of justification for protest.
Protest justification was measured on a seven-point scale, so we estimated these
models using both ordered logistic regression and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Since
the results were similar, we report the OLS models in the text for ease of substantive
interpretation; ordered logit models appear in the Appendix. 48 As expected by H1,
grievances combined with low risk increase protest justification by 0.49 points in the
minority perspective subsample (model 9) and by 0.38 points in the majority subsample
(model 11). This finding holds across all grievance types for the minority subsample, but

not for the majority subsample (models 10 and 12). In the minority subsample, each
form of grievance increased protest justification: discrimination by 0.54 points;
repression of political rights by 0.47 points; and, physical harm by 0.47 points. In the
majority subsample, low risk combined with repression of political rights increases or
physical harm increases justification for protest by .34 (p < .1) and .63 points,
respectively. With the exception of physical harm in the majority condition, high risk
does not have a statistically significant effect on justification for protest.
Table 4. Provide financial support for protest. (Table view)

Grievance (dummy)
Discrimination
Political rights
Physical harm
High risk
Grievance × High risk
Discrimination × High
risk
Political rights × High
risk
Physical harm × High
risk
Manipulation check
passed
SDO
RWA
Age
Minority (dummy)
Observations

Minority perspective
subsample
Model 5
Model 6
1.90* (0.58)
2.00 † (0.72)
1.29 (0.50)
2.50* (0.89)
1.34 (0.51)
1.34 (0.52)
0.95 (0.40)
0.95 (0.48)

Majority perspective
subsample
Model 7
Model 8
0.92 (0.27)
0.61 (0.24)
1.15 (0.38)
0.99 (0.34)
0.75 (0.27)
0.75 (0.27)
1.59 (0.65)
2.05 (1.07)

1.19 (0.62)

1.49 (0.71)

0.79 (0.39)

1.51 (0.73)

1.55* (0.30)

1.57* (0.31)

1.45* (0.25)

1.43* (0.25)

0.72*** (0.06)
0.82** (0.05)
1.02*** (0.01)
1.18 (0.23)
1228

0.72*** (0.06)
0.82*** (0.05)
1.02*** (0.01)
1.17 (0.23)
1228

0.78*** (0.06)
0.83** (0.05)
1.02*** (0.01)
0.88 (0.19)
1197

0.77** (0.07)
0.83*** (0.06)
1.02*** (0.01)
0.87 (0.18)
1197

Logistic regression models. Constants not reported.
Note. Odds ratios are presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Turning to the individual differences, a one-unit increase in SDO decreases protest
justification by 0.46 points in the minority-perspective subsample and by 0.34 points in
the majority-perspective subsample. Similarly, a one-unit increase in RWA decreases
protest justification by 0.08 points in the minority perspective and 0.11 or 0.12 points in

the majority perspective subsample. Interestingly, participants who were assigned to the
minority perspective and are themselves members of a minority ethnic group in real life
were less likely to justify protest (0.38-point decrease). This is the first model where
participants’ own identity impacted the outcome variable. Participant race had no impact
on protest justification in the majority perspective subsample.
Table 5. Justification for protest. (Table view)

Grievance (dummy)
Discrimination
Political rights
Physical harm
High risk
Grievance × High risk
Discrimination × High
risk
Political rights × High
risk
Physical harm × High
risk
Manipulation check
passed
SDO
RWA
Age
Minority (dummy)
Observations

Minority perspective
subsample
Model 9
Model 10
0.49** (0.15)
0.54** (0.18)
0.47* (0.18)
0.47** (0.18)
0.03 (0.19)
0.04 (0.19)
−0.24 (0.22)
−0.34 (0.28)

0.79***
(0.11)
−0.46***
(0.05)
−0.08* (0.03)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.38***
(0.11)
1211

Majority perspective
subsample
Model 11
Model 12
0.38* (0.15)
0.18 (0.19)
0.34 † (0.18)
0.63*** (0.18)
0.06 (0.19)
0.06 (0.19)
−0.29 (0.22)
−0.04 (0.28)

−0.13 (0.26)

−0.21 (0.26)

−0.25 (0.26)

−0.61* (0.28)

0.80***
(0.11)
−0.46***
(0.05)
−0.08* (0.03)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.38***
(0.11)
1211

0.70*** (0.10)

0.70*** (0.10)

−0.34***
(0.04)
−0.12** (0.04)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.21 † (0.12)

−0.34***
(0.04)
−0.11** (0.04)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.21 † (0.12)

1187

1187

Notes. Ordinary least squares regression models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constants not reported.
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Supporting H1, we see that grievance combined with low risk of punishment is
associated with greater odds of engaging in political action among the minority across
models. This relationship is less consistent for those in the majority group, a finding
broadly consistent with H2. We also find that high risk of punishment reduces

willingness to engage in protest across both the minority and majority conditions. The
effect sizes are larger for those in the minority condition, which is consistent with H2 as
well. Interestingly, we find that a high risk of punishment combined with grievance
consistently reduces the likelihood of engaging in protest. But this effect is largely
confined to those assigned to the minority condition, and does not influence willingness
to donate to the protestors’ cause or to consider the protest as justified. We suggested
above that this may be due to the fact that subjects in our experiment inferred that the
true cost of any punishment would be greater for those who actually protest than for
those who provide moral or financial support to the dissidents. Supporting our fourth
and fifth hypotheses, we also see consistent patterns across models for SDO and RWA.
As expected, participants with higher scores on both measures consistently showed
lower odds of protesting or donating to the protest and were less likely to think protest
was justified. These findings also held across the minority and majority subsamples.
Thus, combining situational and individual-level factors helps to explain why some
people experience conditions like grievances, yet do not support action.

Discussion and Conclusion
In the present study, we examined the relative contributions of different types of
grievance, risk of punishment, and social identity on willingness to engage in and
support for protest using an experimental paradigm. To account for person-based
variance in protest support, we also considered the two individual differences
highlighted by the dual-process model of intergroup attitudes (i.e., SDO and RWA). We
found empirical support for the prediction that grievances have a demonstrable impact
on a range of action choices. Our findings confirm the causal mechanisms proposed
throughout a large body of large-N and qualitative work on the bases of protest and
protest support. At the same time, the effect of grievance is influenced by risk and
identity. Additionally, type of grievance impacts actions, especially as a function of
social identity. The odds of protest in our experiment are lower when the participant
faces a higher risk of punishment. These relationships largely disappear when we
consider donations to the protestors or the justification of protest, a difference we
attribute to the lower likely costs of punishments for each of these actions. Finally, net of
situational differences in grievance, risk, and identity salience, SDO, and RWA were
both associated with reduced willingness to protest, support protest financially, and
justify protest.
Thus, our findings suggest that grievances, risk of punishment, social identity, and
individual differences in sociopolitical orientation all play a role in willingness to engage
in or support protest. Importantly, our findings shed particular light on how identity
influences different forms of contentious political activity. Identity matters, but it matters

more in some situations than others. The introduction of factors favorable to protest—a
strong grievance and low risk of punishment—leads to more protest support by
members of majority and minority groups. This helps to explain how many successful
movements by minority groups have attracted support from outsiders, who in our
experiments appear to be motivated by the same factors.
Of course, our research design is not without its limitations. One such limitation is
that the respondents may not identify strongly with the hypothetical situation described
by the treatment. The population from which our sample is drawn is adults in the United
States, few of whom may have any direct experience with discrimination, political
repression, or physical repression as depicted in the vignettes. In particular, we might
expect that Americans with little direct experience of discrimination or repression would
be less likely to support political action. This means that the specific relationships in this
experiment might not generalize to populations where true grievances exist. This is a
limitation but one that should not be over-emphasized. The key advantage of an
experiment such as this is that it allows a clean and direct assessment of theoretical
propositions that are difficult to test with observational data. Further, in our related work
that samples from the general population of countries with higher levels of grievances
among the public, results are often null. 49 On the face, this would suggest that
grievances do not impact action among these samples, although this is clearly not the
case. As noted previously, we expect that null results in these related studies result
from our treatments only moving the needle slightly as compared to the actual
grievances that participants face in their real lives. For this reason alone, sampling from
the general U.S. adult population is beneficial for confirming the causal mechanism
proposed in other research. Finally, and very importantly, support from the general
public impacts the success of collective action by a few people. From this perspective,
results by a few people from a national sample can shed crucial light on the psychology
behind mass support for contentious politics.
While there are many benefits to experimental research, one drawback to our design
is that we cannot measure actual protest behavior. Positive responses to these
questions are higher than what observational studies would suggest are the real levels
of protest in response to grievances. For example, Table 2 suggests that over a third of
respondents would engage in protest. This seems likely to be a somewhat higher rate of
protest than one observes in the real world. For example, the AmericasBarometer 2008
survey 50 shows that about half this number (18.2 percent) reported that they had
engaged in a protest march during the previous twelve months. We interpret these
responses as more similar to symbolic expressions of support for such actions instead
of realistic commitments by all respondents to actually protest. We note, though, that
there is some research that compares hypothetical and actual behavior in experiments
in other contexts. 51 However, we decided to ask respondents whether they would

commit to or refrain from action (rather than simply asking them if they supported such
action) as a way to push them to think seriously about the potential risks of doing so that
are described in the vignettes. Insofar as mass support for contentious politics impacts
the movement’s success, our results provide insight into factors that impact views of
these movements. Further, as prior research shows, sampling from actual protest
participants yields important insights into reasons why people decide to protest or
support protest. Yet experimental research is necessary to isolate and confirm causal
mechanisms. In this process, it is both infeasible and unethical to measure actual
engagement in contentious politics.
Our findings also suggest a number of directions for future work on relationships
between grievances and mobilization. One possibility would be to seek to validate these
findings in other cultural and political contexts. It is possible that variation in these
contexts might alter specific conclusions. Investigating this possibility in a systematic
fashion has the potential to make a significant contribution to our understanding of
whether or not the effects of grievances on mobilization are universal. Survey
experiments of the type employed here have the potential to address many of the
issues that observational analysis of the effects of repression pose, including
measurement problems and endogenous relationships between mobilization and
repression. We hope that future research will explore these avenues and others in an
effort to better understand the genesis of political action.
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